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China 
Wei Wu and Tom Vander Beken 
 [Abstract] 
This paper presents a historical analysis of Chinese legal theories and the 
evolution of criminal interrogation rules from the pre-Han to the reform era. A 
fuller understanding of the evolution of rules is doubtless relevant to the present 
day’s controversy in China’s legal reforms surrounding the right to remain silent 
during interrogation and the privilege against self-incrimination. The historical 
analysis reveals that the imperial social context which once morally legitimized 
judicial torture in Chinese criminal justice is very much alive even today. For 
future legal reforms in China, there are barriers in the current social context, 
which seem to be unconducive for the right to remain silent and the privilege 
against self-incrimination. But, traditional native resources are also available to 
legal reformers to ensure better protection of the rights of the suspect subject to 
police interrogation, and to eliminate police-coerced confessions. 
 
1 Introduction 
 The agreement that we shall all have interrogation justice seems to be one of 
the few points of consensus in the pluralistic societies around the world (Ma, 
2007). Within every criminal justice, we see various mechanisms ostensibly 
designed to constrain and shape the way in which the police exercise their 
questioning powers (Van Kessel, 1998). However, miscarriages of justice, such as 
wrongful detention, prosecution, and incarceration of the innocent, because of 
coercive and psychologically manipulative interrogation1 techniques arise both 
                                                             
1
 In many Western countries, there is a tendency to use the concept of “investigative 
interviewing” as an alternative to interrogation. For instance, in England, the expression 
“investigation interviewing” is used to describe questioning of suspects and victims, as well 
as witnesses at any point in the investigative process (Williamson, 1993; Gudjonsson, 1994). 
This change is a result of the combined effects of new legislation, psychological 
development, and organizational policies designed to make the questioning of suspect less 
inherently coercive. It is hoped that this ethical approach to investigation could elicit reliable 
information from a person about an alleged offence (Brewer and Williams, 2005). Indeed, as 
a result of these efforts, police questioning has come a long way. However, there is still a 
long way to go before the principles of investigative interviewing are reflected in standard 
police practice (Williamson, 1993, 98; Gudjonsson, 1994). 
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in more adversarial and more inquisitorial types of process (Bedau and Radelet, 
1987; Gudjonsson, 1992, 1994). The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
has condemned violations of ‚the right to remain silent under police questioning 
and the privilege against self-incrimination‛ everywhere, in Great Britain as well 
as on the continent (Wu, 2011). In the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the 
problem of police-coerced confession is also one of the most intensely criticized 
aspects of the Chinese legal system (Wu & Vander Beken, 2010). 
 
For obvious reasons, obtaining information on the extent of coercion exerted 
in extracting a confession for a criminal investigation is nearly impossible. 
According to the fourth report from the Chinese government to the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), between 1999 and 20042, 566 persons, involved 
in 541 cases, were sentenced by extorting confessions through torture3. However, 
Ma and Peng (2006: 22) consider that official statistics document only the tip of 
the iceberg, implying thereby that forced confessions occur with greater 
frequency than officially reported. Many Chinese scholars, relying on different 
sources like interviews with present and former law enforcement officers or 
individual field observations, have made the alarming assertion that the malady 
of confessions produced by torture 4  (xingxunbigong 刑讯逼供 )  has been 
widespread in China (Wu and Vander Beken, 2010). Notably, the problem of 
interrogation practices has been so pernicious and pervasive that it captured the 
attention of not only the domestic academic community, but also of the 
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 Chinese version of the fourth periodic report, pages 36-40. 
3
 Article 1 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) is the first provision in an international treaty 
that defines torture, and separates illegal practices into two categories: (i) torture, and cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment (ii) punishment which does not amount to torture. 
According to this definition, to classify an act as torture, the pain of suffering inflicted must 
indeed be severe. 
4
 The Chinese academics define torture in a broader sense than the CAT does. They define 
torture as any act by which corporal treatment or quasi-corporal treatment is inflicted on a 
suspect or a defendant to extract confessions by judicial officers (Zhe, 2005). Corporal 
treatment refers to physical coercion, inflicting pain directly on the body, such as beating or 
imparting electric shock. Quasi-corporal treatment refers to physical or psychological 
coercion, inflicting pain (physical or mental) indirectly on the body, such as through sleep 
deprivation, exposure to cold or heat, or forcing one to sit or stand in uncomfortable 
positions. 
In fact, some studies have shown that in the current era the interrogation practice in China 
has moved away from brutally scarring violence towards more time-consuming and ‘clean 
torture’ (Wu & Vander Beken, 2010, 561).Notably, the history of American police 
interrogation also shows an evolution from more brutal forms of interrogation toward a 
mainly psychological oriented approach of interrogation (Leo, 2008). While the 1931 
Wickersham Commission Report and Miranda appear to be partly responsible for the 
dramatic decline in violence in the American interrogation room from the 1930s through 
1960s, it is argued that American police have also become skilled at the practice of 
manipulation and deception during interrogation (Leo 1992). 
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international community. Scathing reports from Non-government Organizations 
(NGOs) and other overseas human rights institutions observe that torture has 
been widespread and systemic5. Human rights activists complain bitterly that 
the judiciary lacked independence, because the party-state politicized criminal 
cases and employed torture for oppressing political dissent. Noting that the 
Chinese criminal procedure, particularly the one for interrogation, is 
inconsistent with the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to remain 
silent, the rights activists urge the PRC for compliance with the ‚universal‛ 
norms6. 
 
While not denying that much remains to be done, the Chinese government is 
not happy with the foreign critics for discounting the progress it made in the 
promotion and protection of human rights, including its efforts to combat 
torture, and for exaggerating the severity of the problems by focusing on the 
relatively few cases involving political dissidents 7 . On the other hand, 
acknowledging that involuntary confession in criminal investigations remains a 
serious problem, it has taken various steps to address it, including reforming its 
procedural law and educating police officials about the importance of due 
process. Indeed, although China was governed largely as a ‚lawless‛ state in the 
first three decades after the founding of the PRC, the past 20 years witnessed 
significant changes in the Chinese criminal justice landscape which sets 
restrictive standards for police behaviour and provides procedural safeguards to 
suspects subject to police interrogation. Nevertheless, the government still feels 
uneasy about some ‚undeniable‛ principles in western criminal procedures, 
such as the presumption of innocence and the privilege against self-
incrimination (Gelatt, 1982; Ren, 2007). The officials in the legal committee of the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress explained that the 
Chinese approach to criminal investigation is not to engage either in the 
‚presumption of guilt‛ or in the ‚presumption of innocence‛ (Man and Li, 1999: 
63). The Chinese criminal procedure does not presume anything—it lets 
evidence and facts speak for themselves (Gelatt, 1982). Stressing on reliable 
evidence and strict prohibition on extracting confessions by torture, the revised 
criminal procedure law (CPL) in 1996 continues to adopt the principle of ‚taking 
facts as the basis and law as the criterion‛ (CPL, Art. 6) and to encourage 
                                                             
5
 See, for instance, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA17/094/2008/en/bb7a7607-8f0b-11dd-8d03-
3f760a3cc4a3/asa170942008en.pdf and 
http://www.falunhr.org/reports/PDFs/ShadowReportOnChina2008.pdf.  
6
 The rights activists argued that there is a significant level of consensus regarding “the 
presumption of innocence” and “the privilege against self-incrimination” as set forth in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (Art. 11), and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (Art. 14) (Gelatt, 1982). 
7
 Comments by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to the concluding 
observations and recommendations of the Committee against Torture (CAT/C/CHN/CO/4).  
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suspects to ‚answer questions asked by investigators truthfully‛8 (CPL, Art. 93) 
to achieve truthful and fair justice. 
 
In fact, the Chinese government’s position is by no means universally shared. 
The majority view among Chinese legal scholars is that pernicious interrogation 
is closely related to China’s pre-trial inquisitorial investigation with its implicit 
acceptance of police power to detain and interrogate suspects (Zuo 2005; Chen 
2006). Hence, many Chinese academics have increasingly looked to the right of 
remaining silent and the privilege against self-incrimination as the basis for 
restricting the questioning power of the police and for pressing law enforcement 
to shoulder most of the load by collecting objective evidence of the crime 
charged (Ning, 2002; Wan, 2006). Although there have been many legal attempts 
to establish the right and the privilege, there is currently a growing scepticism in 
the academic world if the apparently successful experience of the West with 
‚due process‛, and an accusatorial system in which defendants are privileged to 
remain passive, can simply be copied as an independent standard in the Chinese 
context (Cui, 2001; Ma and Peng, 2006). According to Peerenboom (2004: 1073), 
transplantation of laws which are at odds with China’s current conditions or 
which are based on fundamental values that are not shared by the majority of 
Chinese citizens, diminishes the likelihood of getting the reforms adopted or, 
even if they are adopted, they will not be implemented. This observation seems 
to be confirmed by the fact that despite significant revisions to the Criminal 
Procedure law in 1996, the police’s abuse of questioning power, such as coercing 
for confession, illegal detention and denying lawyers’ access to their clients, 
remains pervasive in practice (Lin, 2005). 
 
This paper presents a historical analysis of Chinese legal theories and the 
evolution of criminal interrogation rules from the pre-Han to the reform era. A 
fuller understanding of the evolution, besides being desirable for its own sake, is 
definitely relevant to the present day’s controversy surrounding the right to 
remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination. The purpose of the 
historical analysis is twofold. On the one hand, by exploring the historical, 
political, and philosophical backdrop of current reforms, it is easier for 
(Western) legalists to understand how the right and the privilege in China 
develop along a different path. On the other hand, only after understanding 
China’s legal traditions, can one begin to ascertain what traditional native 
resources are available to reformers, and what obstacles are they likely to 
encounter in trying to establish the right and the privilege, given China’s past. 
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 Eliciting reliable information from a suspect is a complex process in which both the 
interviewer and interviewee play integral roles. Ultimately, the quality of any police 
interview is determined by a wide range of interrelated factors (Brewer and Williams, 2005, 
11). Nonetheless, Chinese lawmakers believed that cooperative interviewing styles rather 
than a confrontational style of interviewing could best lead to accurate information and 
confessions. 
6 
 
    This paper is structured as follows. The first section documents the rise of 
Confucianism and legalism during the Spring and Autumn period (770-476 B.C.) 
and illustrates their legal implications. This is followed by an analysis of the 
‚legalization of Confucianism‛ process in Chinese society following the Qing’s 
fall (221-206 B.C.). The paper will then focus on the Tang dynasty (618-907) and 
discuss the interrogation model laid down by the Tang Code which thrived until 
the early twentieth century. Next, after tracing the ideological evolution in China 
in the turbulent period before the birth of the PRC, the interrogation rules under 
the Mao era will be examined. In the following section, the questioning rules and 
their operation in the reform era are discussed, as also the social and political 
context underlying them. The last section presents the conclusions. 
 
2 Classical Legal Theories 
The era of the Spring and Autumn period (770-476 B.C.), though 
characterized by interstate warfare with many Chinese in despair, was 
intellectually one of the most productive eras in Chinese history. Many 
philosophers propounded various theories. From these theories, two major 
schools of thought—Confucianism and legalism—eventually emerged, and they 
remained central to Chinese legal thought down to the twenty first century. 
 
2.1 Confucianism 
2.1.1 Shame, Self-examination and Self-cultivation 
Confucianism was first conceived and developed by Confucius (551-479 
B.C.), when he was an itinerant teacher. In his theories, Confucius adhered to the 
premise that humans are essentially good by nature and that their good qualities 
can be brought out through education (Terrill, 2003; Chen 2004). The ultimate 
goal of Confucian’s personal cultivation was to achieve self-perfection, as 
represented by the concept of ren (benevolence, 仁), which means becoming the 
most genuine, most sincere, and the most humane person one can be (Tu, 1979). 
This process of self-perfection requires self-discipline and the observation of li9 
(ritual propriety, 礼) (Analects, 12:1). Through internalization of li, individuals 
will develop a sense of shame when they have done something wrong. 
Moreover, shame will direct the person inward for self-examination, and 
motivates the person toward socially and morally desirable changes (Analects, 
2:3). Thus, admitting one’s misconduct and desiring to change oneself, which is 
believed to be an act of expiation requiring personal courage, is a virtuous 
sensibility that a Confucian values and fosters (Fung, 2006). 
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 li is essentially a set of ethical norms that provide guidance for appropriate behaviors in all 
circumstances of life, spanning from ordinary daily activities to special ceremonies, 
prescribed on the basis of a person’s social status (Kaempfer, 2006). 
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2.1.2 Community, Deviance and Contrition 
Confucius made it clear that li is and should be based on human nature and 
universal reasons (Ma, 1987). Though human relationships are manifold, 
Confucius emphasized the society’s ‚natural‛ relationships. He said: ‚Let the 
monarch be a monarch, and the minister a minister. Let the father be a father, 
and the son a son‛ (Analects, 12:11). Put differently, each individual should act in 
accordance with his role in life. Mencius (372-289 B.C.), an important 
philosopher of early Confucianism, elaborated the content of each relationship 
that must be jointly realized by both the parties concerned: ‚Affection between 
father and son, righteousness between ruler and minister, separate functions 
between husband and wife, precedence of the old over the young, and fidelity 
between friends (Mencius 5)‛. Considering the relationships separately, the 
elaboration consists in the father being merciful and the son filial, the ruler being 
a leader by superior virtue and the minister a loyal follower, the husband being 
upright and the wife complaisant, the elder brother being caring and the 
younger brother complying respectfully, and friends being faithful to each other. 
Seen in this perspective, Confucianism is decidedly paternalistic with each 
relationship carrying obligations of respect and submission by its members. 
Nonetheless, Confucian’s relationships also stress a sense of reciprocity (bao, 报), 
that is, those who have increased authority shall also have increased 
responsibilities (Johnson, 1995). 
 
Confucius taught that one of the superior’s responsibilities is to be the role 
model for the subordinates (Analects, 2:19, 8:2). The personal moral aspiration of 
achieving ren is an early and ongoing process which can be achieved only 
through communal participation and efficacious communications. Importantly, 
to Confucius, those who are engaged in such moral education can best do so by 
setting themselves as personal examples (Ma, 1987; Windrow, 2006). By so 
doing, the superior inspires the subordinates with virtues and prevents them 
from crossing the social deviance line into criminal activity. Ultimately, the 
benefits of proper behaviour would diffuse throughout the society and 
strengthen social harmony (Peerenboom, 2002). 
 
Under these communitarian social conditions, individuals, almost always, 
find themselves belonging to a closely integrated group that reflects their 
honour or shame. More specifically, when people achieve well, the entire 
community shares the honor. Likewise, when people fail, they do not lose just 
their own face (mianzi, 面子), but of all those around them (Wilson, 1980, 1981). 
Apparently, shame, in Confucian communities, is a group concern, rather than 
an individual concern (Hu, 1944). This group concern and mutual ‚interest‛ also 
ensure interdependency and reinforces mutual obligation and supervision 
among neighbours. 
 
8 
 
Apart from this, in the light of the Confucian belief in humanity’s capacity for 
moral improvement through education, shaming is also used as a mechanism in 
reforming wrongdoers – what might today be labelled as rehabilitation or 
reintegration. As mentioned earlier, shame is primarily related to morality; so, 
people would show anger or even extreme rage toward those who commit 
shameful acts (Lu, Zhang and Miethe, 2002). Nevertheless, from a Confucian 
perspective, even though shameful acts generate anger in people, the 
wrongdoer’s showing a sense of shame and admitting his guilt signal that he 
realizes his moral faults. They also demonstrate that one promises to reform 
oneself and seeks reconciliation with the larger community, thereby displaying 
socially ‚engaging emotions‛ (Kitayama, Markus & Kurokawa, 2000). This 
would result in forgiveness commensurate with the degree of contrition. 
 
Because Confucians stressed using shame to mitigate deviancy and re-
socialize individuals, they regarded the codification and public dissemination of 
laws sends the wrong kind of message (Peerenboom, 2002; Windrow, 2006). 
According to Confucius, laws, backed up by punishments, may induce 
compliance in the external behaviour of society members, but they are powerless 
to change their inner character (Analects 2:3). Theoretically, this view leaves little 
room for the operation of codified law and punishment. On the contrary, it 
constitutes a sphere of informal social control operating on a familial or 
communitarian basis through moral persuasion and social education. 
 
2.2 Legalism 
Confucian was rivalled from the very beginning. Legalism that had arisen 
during the early Warring State period (475-221 B.C.) advocated a social control 
program which was in direct conflict with Confucian ideals. In the legalistic 
view, human beings are naturally greedy and selfish. Thus, virtue cultivation 
and moral examples are inadequate to maintain the social order because 
people’s base instincts will constantly drive them to wrongful behaviour (Ren, 
1997). The only way to make them behave correctly and to achieve a well-
ordered society is by an impartial system of rewards and punishments. 
Specifically, legalists advocate centralization of authority in the ruler through 
creation of a vast bureaucracy and extensively written laws, and the use of 
harsh, universally enforced penal code to ensure compliance with state policy. 
They believe that if even minor infractions are ruthlessly punished, then no one 
will dare to commit serious crimes (Shang Jun Shu, 17:3). 
 
In theory, the ruler remains the ultimate authority. Han Feizi (281-233 B.C.), a 
prominent philosopher of legalism, advocated that the ruler should use Fa (law, 
法), shu (tactic, 术) and shi (power, 势) to govern his subjects (Peerenboom, 2002). 
It is seen clearly that legalistic law is one of the means to serve the interest of the 
ruler, not necessarily the common people. 
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3 Two Legal Theories Combined: Legalistic 
Bureaucracy to Enforce Confucian Norms 
The Zhou dynasty (1046-256 B.C.) maintained fairly effective control of China 
for a few generations, but then gradually lost its grip. After 770 B.C., real power 
was divided among a number of states. During the war period, Qin State’s 
minister, Lord Shang (390-338 B.C.), overhauled the state according to legalistic 
ideas. His legalism-inspired reforms deployed a detailed penal code through an 
elaborate, tightly controlled bureaucracy to ensure efficient control in the hands 
of the ruler (Bary, 1995). These reforms, together with other favoured 
agricultural policies, successfully bolstered the state’s power. Finally, Qin state 
unified China and established the Qin Empire (221-206 B.C.). 
 
Unsurprisingly, the Qin dynasty lasted less than twenty years. Although the 
ruthless rule of Qin brought its speedy downfall, the succeeding Han dynasty’s 
emperors, facing tremendous pressure to consolidate their rule in such a large 
territory, retained the Qin’s essential legalist apparatus for central 
administration (Windrow, 2006).  
 
Noticeably, the Confucian intelligentsia at that time started to explore the 
relationship between Confucian li and legalist fa (law). In a similar thought shift, 
Dong Zongshu (179-104 B.C.), a Han Confucian, integrated legalist and Yin-
Yang school of thought to create his own Confucian doctrines. He overhauled 
the standard interpretation of the Confucian classics and advocated combining 
the functions of li and law (fa) by emphasizing the supremacy of li and the 
subservience of law. On the presumption of the operations of Yin (阴) and Yang (
阳), he further emphasized the emperor’s sacrosanct power in governing the 
state and in enacting laws. Simply put, this shift in Confucian thought 
legitimized the use of bureaucracy, recognized the role of law and punishment, 
and helped to uphold the superiority of the emperor (Ma, 1987). Eventually, 
Emperor Wu (157-87 B.C.) adopted Confucianism as the official orthodox 
doctrine. 
 
Since then, Confucian’s moral standards started to become a part of the 
content of law, and criminal code became the instrument for executing such 
content. In addition, on the ground, as the people trained in Confucianism began 
to take on adjudicatory positions in the government, Confucian thought shaped 
Han’s administration (Windrow, 2006). Even after the Han dynasty’s fall in 220, 
successive dynasties continued to accelerate the Confucianization of the legal 
code. Perhaps most importantly, the Tang Code, first issued in 637 and last 
revised in 737 during the Tang dynasty (618-907), represents the final synthesis 
of legalist and Confucian ideals begun centuries before (Ma, 1987, 673). 
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4 The Criminal Interrogation Rules under the 
Tang Code 
The Tang Code is characterized by Confucian’s moral standards (li) and its 
penal attribute. The Code’s preamble states that the primary aim of the law is to 
maintain human order as coordinated with the cosmic order of Heaven and 
Earth. In other words, the ruler’s remedial use of law is to redress human 
disorders and restore the proper balance between man and nature. Hence, if a 
crime happens, the truth has to be discerned so that the state could administer 
appropriate punishments10 and restore social harmony (Ren, 1997, 31). Because 
of this assumption, finding factual guilt, which insists on the offender’s 
voluntary or coerced admission of guilt and repentance of the crime, is an almost 
indispensable element for concluding criminal cases before the courts (Tang 
Code, Art. 476). 
 
Therefore, undergirding the interrogation procedure of the Tang trial was a 
set of rules whose purpose was to persuade or oblige the accused to respond or 
confess to the charges against him. 
 
4.1 The Structure of an “Accused Speaks” Trial 
The criminal case was first investigated, prosecuted and tried by a district 
magistrate11 who was both the judge and chief administrator of the region. In 
fact, the Confucian family concept was extended to judicial and governmental 
affairs, where the district magistrate was called ‘parent’ officer (fu-mu guan, 父
母官) with presumably good moral characteristics, such as benevolence and 
impartiality, and superior wisdom (Alford, 1984). As Ren (1997: 25) put it, ‚the 
government was not a public servant body, but a sacrosanct paternity‛. 
 
The structure of the trial inquiry can be described as paternalistic when 
historical sources allow one to see how a Chinese imperial criminal trial was 
conducted. Generally, at trial, both the accused and the accuser were required to 
kneel on the ground in front of the magistrate who was assigned the 
responsibility of ferreting out the facts (Gelatt, 1982). The accused, with no aid of 
a counsel, replied insistently to the questioning and to the testimony of the 
accusers. Moreover, the magistrate, as an authority in a leading position, could 
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 Penalties in imperial China were designed to fit the criminal, not the crime (Ansley, 1986, 
171). 
11 Like all dynasties since the Qin, the Tang government operated through its bureaucracy, 
brimming with officials who had passed the imperial examinations based on the Confucian 
Classics (Windrow, 2006). 
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control the content and direction of the interactions for his purpose (Chang, 
2004). 
 
4.2 Confession by Persuasion 
As observed above, the questioning session in courtrooms permitted the 
magistrate to control and extend the questioning sequences as he deems 
necessary to extract the desired response. Suspects, by contrast, were required to 
interactively respond to the questions asked. Responding to these pressures, the 
guilty would often resort to lies to escape conviction. Though this frequently 
instinctive desire of the guilty to play the innocent was recognized, the Tang’s 
trial was not concerned about exposing the magistrate to the suspect’s dubious 
statements. On the contrary, the Code provided that the magistrate should sit 
back at the beginning of the case and expect that evidence damaging to the 
suspect would come out of his altercation with the accuser and witnesses (Art. 
476). It was believed that precious information can be obtained even from false 
denials of guilt, inconsistencies, and other verbal and non-verbal expressions 
emanating from the suspect (Zu, 2008). In addition to the special attention given 
to the time sequence of the questioning, the Code went on to specify that both 
the accused and the accuser’s statements should be verified to the extent feasible 
(Art. 476). Thus, for example, if a suspect confessed to a murder, he was 
supposed to be asked where he put the weapon. If he said he threw it into the 
river, the magistrate was supposed to send someone to find it, so that when 
fetched, it could corroborate the confession. 
 
Eventually, if the suspect managed to prove to the magistrate’s satisfaction 
during the course of the interrogation that he was innocent and had been falsely 
accused, one way to maintain proper balance of social harmony was to punish 
the accuser for the crime of false accusation (Gelatt, 1982). On the other hand, if 
the suspicions were established, the suspect would be greatly shamed or 
criticized  to make the ‘offender’ feel ashamed of his crime and persuade him to 
change his mind, repent and admit to the crime facts (Ren, 1997; Chang, 2004). 
The Chinese literature, arts and folklore often tell that the magistrate talked 
loudly, powerfully, and fiercely to urge on the reluctant suspect to confess. 
 
4.3 Confession by Judicial Torture 
Judicial torture, at least in theory, was reserved as a last resort for those who 
were under strong suspicion, but chose to defy confession of their moral faults 
(Tang Code, Art. 476). It had been long recognized by Chinese lawmakers that 
the agony of torture may induce the innocent to confess things that they never 
did (Zu, 2008). Hence, a highly detailed set of rules governing the application of 
torture was put forward by the Code to enhance the reliability of tortured 
confessions and to acquit the innocent. First, the torture practices were permitted 
only in cases where the evidence strongly tended to establish the suspect’s guilt. 
12 
 
As observed earlier, Article 476 of the Code lays down specific procedures 
regarding interrogation, such as the confrontation between the accused and the 
accuser, and the co-examination of objective evidence. By and large, the 
magistrates were not vested with discretionary powers; they were required to 
strictly enforce the statutory rules (Alford, 1984; MacCormack, 1987). Hence, 
violations of these rules by magistrates carried a punishment of sixty strokes 
with a wooden stick (Tang Code, Art. 476). Second, magistrates needed prior 
approval of higher officials for torture decision. (Tang Code, Art. 476). Third, the 
types of torture were limited to whipping or beating with a bamboo strip or 
wooden stick, and adjusted depending on the suspect’s responses during the 
examination. The Code provided that the torture should not exceed 3 
applications, with an interval of 20 days; the number of whippings or beatings 
should not exceed 200 in total. If the suspect refused to confess even after these 
beatings, he should be released subject to obtaining a guarantor pending the trial 
(Tang Code, Art. 477). Presumably, 20 days for repentance or confession was 
considered reasonable for individuals to ‘reflect on’ their acts. This also can be 
seen as another example of the law makers’ intent to deter undesirable social 
behaviour and to change the wrongdoer’s mind. 
 
4.4 Factual Guilt 
All this clearly implies that the essential purpose of the criminal interrogation 
at the Tang trial was not finding the legal guilt of crime by using legally 
admissible statements against the accused, but, rather, discovering the factual 
guilt through the offender’s confession and making the wrongdoer morally 
shameful and remorseful. The judicial torture, which, together with the 
confession reward policy 12 , was lenient to those who complied with the 
government, fortified the wrongdoer’s deference to legal authority. 
 
4.5 A Stable Model for Centuries 
Through the interplay between Confucian moral standards and legalist’s 
bureaucracy, this ‘persuasive’ interrogation model of the Tang Code proved 
astoundingly stable by thriving until the early twentieth century. 
 
On the one hand, rather than simply enforcing an arbitrary set of 
government-defined criminal procedures, the interrogation rules noticeably 
reflected social norms which were already pervasive, providing legal 
enforcement with powerful social legitimacy. In fact, after Confucianism became 
the official orthodox doctrine in China, families who were affluent enough to 
practice it engaged private tutors to teach their children Confucianism. 
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 The Tang Code provided detailed statutory clarifications of penalty reduction or remission 
for offenders who confessed or surrendered voluntarily according to the seriousness of their 
offences (Rickett, 1971; Ren, 1997).  
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Schoolboys were also required to learn the entire Analects by heart (Grant, 1989). 
Among the poor families, Confucianism was passed on by parents or other 
adults from generation to generation (Jiang, Lambert and Wang, 2007). 
Therefore, there is good reason to believe that Confucianism’s moral standards, 
particularly those dealing with contrition, patriarchal relationships and familial 
obligations, were to some extent internalized within Chinese citizens. 
Meanwhile, as observed earlier, since the Han dynasty, Confucian doctrines also 
served as the guiding light to define what might or might not become a matter of 
law and govern the administration of criminal penalties. The consensus between 
law and morality often indicates that what the state seeks to enforce by 
compulsion corresponds largely to the sense of right and wrong of the society in 
general (Ren, 1997). The judicial torture could be regarded as an extreme case in 
which law and morality become one—what Confucianism morality ‘forbids’, the 
law ‘punishes’. To Westerners, it is fundamental to human liberty that 
individuals cannot lawfully be required to answer incriminating questions that 
will aid in convicting them for a crime (Helmholz, 1997). The imperial Chinese 
may regard submission to legal authority and repentance for unlawful 
behaviour as valuable virtues (Lu and Miethe, 2003). 
 
On the other hand, perhaps more importantly, this ‘persuasive’ interrogation 
model could survive over a millennium in imperial China, not only because 
there was a social consensus between law and morality, but also because of its 
inherent connection with the increased imperial hierarchical powers. As already 
suggested, Confucian codes of morality (li) such as filial piety and loyalty were 
enforced by legalist’s (fa) reward and punishment machineries. In this way, the 
throne, through unrelenting fortification of familial and social hierarchies, 
transformed the family into a de facto extension of the bureaucratic state 
(Windrow, 2006). Indeed, members of society that held relative power in 
informal positions, such as father and brother, had an interest in maintaining the 
social order through the mediation of conflicts, because the restoration of order 
granted them power and prestige over their subordinates. Moreover, imperial 
law unequivocally gave the parents extended rights, ranging from physical 
punishments to commanding their child’s suicide for moral causes (Ren, 1997, 
27). The result in theory, and to a remarkable degree in practice, was a system 
designed to educate wrongdoers in a subtly graded way, which began with the 
minor ‘punishment’ usable by fathers to force their children to confess and 
recognize their moral faults. It was then passed on to the minor but sometimes 
different devices available to intervening authorities, and finally ended with the 
potential application of more severe torture by the formal legal authority. This 
complex gradation ensured that informal, socially-based enforcement of social 
norms occurred continually and finally fortified people’s deference to 
authorities, leading ultimately to consolidation of power in the hands of the 
throne. Under this social structure, district magistrates, members of the real 
ruling class of the society, could maintain their enormous power and authorities 
in courtrooms. In contrast, criminal suspects were put in a disadvantageous 
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position both interactively and socio-culturally. Hence, magistrates could fully 
exercise, as interrogators, their interactive power to humiliate and attack 
criminal suspects’ moral senses, or even torture them, to elicit confession and 
remorse. 
 
4.6 Actual Operation and Legitimacy “Crisis” 
Although the imperial criminal justice encompassed a broad range of 
procedural and administrative measures13 designed to convict the guilty and 
acquit the innocent, and to limit the extent and degree of torture that could be 
applied, it does not, of course, mean that such results were regularly reached or 
that the magistrate’s discretion was always properly controlled. True, the moral 
rhetoric tells that criminal questioning in the courtroom was designed to teach, 
humble, and extract contrition form wrongdoers. However, in reality, in the 
absence of the kinds of procedural protections afforded by a formal legal system, 
good magistrates, learning well in the Confucian Classics but not abusing their 
powers, were episodic and unpredictable. In fact, numerous studies have shown 
that torture was widely abused by magistrates in practice as a ‚short cut‛ to end 
cases (Zu, 2008). Langbein (2004: 101) captures the matter with great insight, 
observing that ‚once legitimated, torture could develop a constituency with a 
vested interest in perpetuating it‛. In addition, as Langbein (2004: 101) further 
pointed out, ‚history’s most import lesson is that it has not been possible to 
make coercion compatible with truth‛. If the magistrate engaged in suggestive 
questioning and the accused knew something about the crime but was still 
innocent, the accused might yield to the pain and torment and confess to things 
that he never did (Langbein, 1977, 2004). Cases arose repeatedly in which the 
real guilty person was detected after an innocent had confessed under duress 
and been convicted and executed (Zhu, 2005). 
 
4.7 Late Imperial China 
On a more macro level, the lack of effective institutional constraints on the 
ruling elites, especially the throne, left the interest of the whole Chinese society 
or the state’s destiny largely at the mercy of those in power. Besides, good 
emperors having both great moral achievements and extraordinary political 
insight were also episodic and unpredictable. Under the Tang (618-907) and 
Song (960-1279) dynasties, China was among the leading cultures of the world, 
far superior to Europe in wealth, technology and science (Moise, 1994). 
However, by the time of Ming dynasty (1368-1644), China had gradually fallen 
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 The accused or the family of the accused virtually had unlimited scope to register their 
protest against a decision to higher authorities through an appellate procedure. Parties 
could even take their case all the way up to the emperor (Alford, 1984). If magistrates were 
found to have rendered wrong judgments, they and even their higher officials would be 
punished according to a complex liability system (MacCormack, 1987). 
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into decline. In the early 17th century, when the British were moving ahead with 
capitalism, China was just then in the final years of the Ming dynasty 
characterized by internal chaos and a ban on maritime trade and interaction 
with foreign countries. By the middle of the 19th century, the continuous 
isolationist policy adopted by the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) was beginning to 
break down in the face of European military threats. 
 
After several failures against foreign military attacks, especially the failure of 
the Boxer Uprising in 1900, Empress Dowager Cixi (1835-1908)—who was under 
the impression that Chinese civilization was superior to all other civilizations of 
the world—was shocked to realize and finally accept the necessity of changing 
the mode of governance in accordance with the changing circumstances to stay 
in power. Hence, New Policies (xinzheng, 新政) were initiated and the revision of 
the legal system was a part of it. Spurred further by foreign pressures and high-
ranking officials, who were anxious to abolish the feudal extraterritoriality, legal 
reform progressed remarkably fast. Thus in 1904, the Bureau of Legal 
Codification was established to draft a new series of code, including the criminal 
and criminal procedure law. Shen Jiaben (1840-1913), the co-director of the 
Bureau, was particularly instrumental in the drafting of the new laws. Shen, 
combining Confucian ethical norms with German and Japanese models of 
punishment and due process, hoped to revive the ideal of a benevolent 
government (renzheng, 仁政) that punishes lightly (xingqing, 刑轻) and forbids 
extracting confessions under torture (Dikötter, 2002). It was Shen and his 
colleagues’ efforts, in January 1911, that made the government put into effect the 
‚New Penal Code of the Great Qing‛. Although some legalists considered this 
code ‘conservative’ with Confucian legal tradition preserved in numerous 
articles, the dominant view still seems to be that it is an important landmark in 
China’s legal modernization (Wang, 1997). In this legal document, corporal 
punishments and extracting confessions by torture were outlawed. 
 
However, the first wave of legal modernization could not take root during 
the turbulent period, following the Qing dynasty’s collapse. Three years later 
after Cixi’s death, the Qing dynasty was overthrown by the Wuhan Uprising on 
October 10, 1911. The establishment of the Republic of China in 1912 by the 
Nationalist Party (known as the Guomindang or GMD) aroused high 
expectations, but within about five years, the central government collapsed 
completely14, and China slipped into an unstable period of warlord factionalism, 
imperial Japan’s invasion, and a civil war between GMD and the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) from 1946 to 1949. 
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(1927–1949), political control of the entire region remained in the hands of warlords. As Zhu 
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Noticeably, an iconoclastic tendency, aimed at destroying the Confucian legal 
traditions, was also advanced during this turbulent period (Ma, 1987). The 
‚legalization of Confucianism‛ by imperial thrones unfortunately brought 
disrespect and even ‘damage’ to both law and Confucianism. As explained, 
Confucius’s belief was that wrongdoers could reform themselves by contrition, 
enlightment, and education. Therefore, Confucius would be the last person to 
approve of ‚compulsory‛ morality by torture and corporal punishments. 
However, owing to the harsh criminal procedure and punishment designed to 
uphold Confucianism’s moral standards, not only was imperial Chinese law 
made largely inhuman, but also Confucianism’s inherent humanity was 
challenged. Consequently, with the downfall of China’s two-millennia-old 
imperial system in 1911, Confucianism not only lost its official status as the state 
orthodoxy but was also undermined as a ‚feudal ideology‛ by both the GMD 
and the CCP. 
 
5 The Criminal Interrogation Rules in the Mao 
Era 
The establishment of the PRC in 1949 was often claimed by Chinese 
Communists as a total break with China’s ‚feudal‛ past (Gelatt, 1982). Replacing 
Confucianism, Marxism-Leninism became the official orthodoxy in guiding 
social transformation and other facets of national affairs. Notably, Marxism has a 
poor opinion of law. It was argued that the capitalist law was nothing more than 
a suppressive tool, which traditionally served the interests of the wealthy 
minority. When the proletarian revolution succeeds, the state will gradually 
wither away and law will not be needed (Engels, 1979, 164). In the interim, law 
was to advance the socialist revolution toward communism and maintain the 
socialist order (Ren, 1997). More precisely, ‚law is to be used by the proletariat 
as a weapon in class struggles against the enemy in order to realize the people’s 
democratic dictatorship‛ (Peerenboom, 2002, 44). 
 
Owing to the dominance of heavily instrumental understanding of law in the 
Mao era, the legal restraints imposed on police power in criminal interrogation 
varied in accordance with the changes in the official attitude toward law and 
depended, to a large extent, on the political mode toward class struggles. 
 
5.1 Rules on Police Interrogation: Ups and Downs 
After the CCP seized power in 1949, the majority of laws in force during the 
Republic were abolished. The Chinese Communists were then beginning to 
develop a socialist legal system of their own (Ren, 1997). After several years of 
experimentation, the period 1954 to 1956 saw a brief enlightenment in China’s 
legal development. In 1954, the first Constitution of PRC was promulgated. 
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Simultaneously, considerable progress was made in the creation of criminal 
justice characterized by separate judiciary, procuratorate, and police functions 
(Gelatt, 1982).  Remarkably, efforts were also made to draft a series of criminal 
procedure rules. According to Article (2:1) of the ‚Provisional Regulation on the 
Investigation Procedures for the Procuratorate‛, promulgated on August 5, 1956, 
the investigator should inform the accused of his defence rights prior to 
interrogation. And, during the questioning, the investigator must give the 
accused sufficient opportunities to explain away the case and make his 
statements. Although silent on the lawyer’s role at the pre-trial investigative 
stage, the Provisional Code has taken a big step forward by showing serious 
concern for objective evidence and not just the extraction of confession. 
 
China’s progress toward a due interrogation process, however, was 
interrupted by the Anti-Rightist movement from 1957 to 1958. The Anti-Rightist 
Movement was a reaction against the ‚Hundred Flowers‛ Campaign (1956-
1957), which was initially promoted by Mao to invite criticism of the 
government and to encourage different views and solutions to national policy 
issues. But, upon further encouragement, the criticisms became scathing and 
drifted from Mao’s intention of consolidating the socialist leadership and 
fighting corruption. In July 1957, Mao ordered a halt to the campaign, and 
shortly thereafter, a series of movements were launched to purge alleged 
‚rightists‛ within the state (Moise, 1994). Consistent with political priority, the 
1956 Provisional Code, which was perceived as ‚dogmatic‛, was annulled by the 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate on August 15, 1958. The lawmakers stressed 
that the crime proofing procedure should not ‚tie the hands and feet of the 
investigators‛. Eventually, in the later promulgated ‚Provisional Regulation on 
the Procedure of Handling Criminal Cases for the Procuratorate (draft)‛15, many 
procedural safeguards for the suspect were removed. In particular, the 
interrogation process became much simplified, with only one legal requirement: 
the accused should be informed at the beginning of the questioning on the 
nature and cause of the accusations against him (Art. 14). 
 
After the failure of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960), during the 
recovering period in the early 1960s, there were resumed efforts to put the 
interrogation procedure back on the due process track. Article 4 of the 
‚Provisional Regulations of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on the 
Examination of Arresting and Prosecution and on Initiating Public Prosecution 
of Cases‛, promulgated on August 26, 1963, provided that all investigatory 
bodies must ‚base cases on facts and take law as the criterion‛. This principle 
was to rely not just on oral statements but on full evidence to ensure just and 
accurate investigation from which ‚the guilty would not escape and by which 
the innocent would not be wronged‛ (Art. 3). The statute went on to emphasize 
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that any person charged with a crime should not be forced to confess (bigongxin, 
逼供信) during the questioning process (Art. 24). 
 
However, the storm of Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) quickly swept away 
the intentions to bring back the interrogation process due, as also justice. In May 
1966, alleging that bourgeois elements were permeating the Party and the 
society at large, Mao ordered that these elements be removed through violent 
class struggle. The Cultural Revolution that ensued witnessed the dark age of 
Chinese legal development, when ‚smashing Gong-Jian-Fa (公检法 , police-
procuratorate-judiciary)‛ became the slogan of the day (Leng, 1982). ‚Mass 
violence‛ against the so-called ‚class enemies‛ through widespread 
incarceration and torture, all without due process, was what they observed (Ren, 
1997: 57). For ordinary criminal procedure, there was no more division of 
functions by investigation, prosecution and trial, and the criminal cases were 
handled by the court, the procuratorate or the police (Wu, 2006). 
 
5.2 On the Ground 
The heavily instrumental nature of the laws, which were periodically altered 
to control undesirable social groups according to political priorities, no doubt 
diminished the official’s respect for law. Consequently, throughout the first 
three decades of the People’s Republic, Party policy and principles served as the 
sole guidelines for law enforcement in handling ‚antagonistic‛ or ‚non-
antagonistic‛ contradictions (Ren, 1997). In fact, in the PRC’s early 
administrations, there was not a ‘decent’ bureaucracy with professionals, such as 
judges and police officers. Zhu (2007: 554) said that the CCP, long after it seized 
power in 1949, ‚remained a revolutionary party in character‛. In Zhu’s opinion, 
the CCP’s strong party organization and ideology during the revolution period 
(1921-1949) compensated for the lack of a modern bureaucracy, though they 
impeded the development of such a bureaucracy. For quite a long time after the 
foundation of the PRC, political loyalty and ideological purity were the most 
important criteria in selecting government personnel and in promoting cadres, 
including those in the judiciary and the Public Security (Ren, 1997; Zhu, 2007). 
 
According to the often claimed Party principle, for the purpose of revealing 
the truth and giving correct treatment16, the investigators should be impartial 
and objective in crime interrogations, and the ‚people‛ as also those defined as 
‚the antagonistic classes‛ should not be coerced into confessing (Wu, 2006, 162). 
However, lacking a stable legal system, those Party claims are only symbolic 
manifestations of formalism that merely provide general guidelines for law 
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 Mao had a lifelong faith in the ability of human beings to change. He was convinced that 
individuals with incorrect views could be reformed (Moise, 1994). Therefore, in investigating 
criminal liabilities, the “factual guilt”, especially the offender’s criminal motives, should be 
ascertained in order to accordingly render criminal penalties (Ren, 1997). 
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enforcement, rather than substantive laws that could impose meaningful 
restraints on the investigator’s questioning powers. Thus, although investigators 
had no reason to wrongfully persecute suspects, neither had investigators any 
particular incentive to be vigilant on behalf of suspects. Not to mention being 
vigilant on behalf of suspects is often potentially inconsistent with or even 
contradictory to the political agenda of class struggles (Chen, 2000). Free of 
substantial restraints, the aspiration of the investigator to capture the suspect as 
a testimonial resource is perfectly ‘understandable’. The investigators 
acknowledged the reason behind their arresting the suspect for questioning. The 
suspect was, after all, the most efficient possible witness in the investigator’s 
eyes (Cui, 2003). Under this situation, unsurprisingly, there have been frequent 
reports of brutality in interrogations that clearly amount to cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment and sometimes even ‘torture’, under contemporary 
international law (Chen, 2000). 
 
At this point, one question arises. No doubt, this type of law enforcement 
must exercise a great deal of discretion so that the players in it could manipulate 
the interrogation procedure according to the practical needs. To understand this 
issue, one should not overlook the influence of the traditional Chinese legal 
culture, which enhanced the rulers’ real and symbolic status as the locus of 
political authority. Although Marxism literally has little in common with 
Chinese tradition, the influence of Confucianism and legalist values remained a 
strong driving force in Communist China even without their official recognition 
(Ren 1997; Peerenboom, 2002). 
 
The Communists, nonetheless, in the process of building a new elite power 
structure, departed from imperial thrones in stressing family loyalty by 
displaying higher loyalty to the state. During the early decades of the socialist 
construction, the informal social control preferred by Confucianism was largely 
institutionalized through urban household registration system, which linked 
individuals’ residency with their entitlement to social programs. The strict 
control of population mobility effectuated different social control mechanisms in 
community, which were primarily responsible for handling local disputes and 
wrongdoers of minor offences (Whyte and Parish, 1984). When individuals 
violated rules under the Security Administration Punishment Act17, the police 
had the authority to impose a series of administrative sanctions without formal 
litigation. Notably, the formal court process was only reserved for offenders who 
committed serious crimes, especially the so-called class enemies who did not 
accept and support the Communist leadership (Rojek, 1985). In this manner, the 
Communist leaders enforced stratifications within the civil society between 
those who supported the socialist state and those who did not, and thus created 
a web of status and privilege in the criminal justice sphere to bolster their own 
legitimacy. Under this arrangement, traditional shaming, moral control, and 
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mutual checks were to some extent as effective as in old times (Rojek, 1985; Lu 
and Drass, 2002). As a result, in the interrogational rooms, the questioners (i.e. 
the police, the procuratorate, and the judge), who were both the representatives 
of the state power and ‘moral executors’, enjoyed enormous authority. On the 
contrary, as in imperial times, suspects were still in a socio-culturally 
disadvantageous position. As such, the contrast in striking power between the 
two status groups gave the law enforcement huge space for manipulation. 
 
6 The Criminal Interrogation Rules in the 
Reform Era 
Upon Mao’s death and the subsequent political downfall of the ‚Gang of 
four‛ in 1976, the CCP’s devotion to the political struggle against class enemies 
quickly faded away. Some of the Right-wing leaders who had been purged 
during the Cultural Revolution were back in position. When the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party met in the famous Third Plenum in 
December 1978, the Right-wing group led by Deng Xiaoping could succeed in 
establishing effective control (Moise, 1994). 
 
The new CCP leadership quickly launched the modernization programme 
which was summarized as the ‚Four Modernization‛—modernization of 
agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and technology. In the 
meantime, many Party leaders, having suffered personally and severely during 
the lawless period of the Cultural Revolution, were eager to advocate greater 
reliance on law as a means to preventing the recurrence of such policy-driven 
excesses. In addition, perhaps more importantly, strengthening the legal system 
was also considered essential to win back legitimacy both at home and abroad 
and to provide an orderly environment for economic development 
(Peerenboom, 2002). 
 
Since then, the new leadership in China made some rapid progress on the 
legislative front. Notably, the first step it took after the ten year turbulence was 
the promulgation of the criminal law and the criminal procedure law in 1979. 
The promulgation of the two laws, no doubt, marked the beginning of the 
redevelopment of China’s criminal justice system (Leng, 1982). Despite 
remarkable progress, in the ensuing years, legal scholars and criminal justice 
practitioners noted various deficiencies in the 1979 CPL (Ma, 2003). Specifically, 
there was a broad consensus that the rights of the suspect were still 
marginalized by the law (Fu, 1998). In an effort to progress towards judicial 
democratization and fairness, China revised the 1979 CPL in 1996. 
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6.1 The Criminal Interrogation Rules under the 1996 
CPL 
No doubt, structures and concepts influenced by the west had already found 
their way into Chinese legislation. However, the drafting of legal texts was 
always greatly influenced by historical experience from which the texts were 
derived, and in the light of the rationale behind such application. The 1996 CPL 
is no exception. In general, its content is in no way similar to that of the old 
imperial codes. Nevertheless, if one compares the central features of 
contemporary interrogation procedure with those of the imperial ‘persuasive’ 
type, it can be seen that many ideas are common to both. The current 
questioning procedure seems to still focus on fact-finding or factual guilt and to 
similarly ‘oblige’ the suspect to respond to the incriminating evidence against 
him, thereby fostering a high level of self-incriminating statements. 
 
6.1.1 Circumstances Surrounding Interrogations 
Under the CPL, the police are given powers to interrogate a suspect under 
two types of situations: 
 
(1) The police may interrogate a suspect after he/she is detained or arrested 
and taken into police custody (CPL, Art. 65, 72); and 
 
(2) The police may summon a suspect, who need not be detained or arrested, 
to a designated place in the city or county where he/she stays for interrogation, 
or the suspect may be interrogated at his/her residence (CPL, Art. 92). 
 
These clauses definitely do not imply that whenever a crime happens the 
police are empowered to interrogate whomever they please. In the first situation, 
after a suspect is detained in the detention house, interrogation of the suspect, a 
typical investigatory act during criminal investigation, would be taken up by the 
police. In the second situation, because official interrogation invades the 
suspect’s privacy and usually results in a rather prolonged limitation of 
freedom, it should not be permitted without antecedent justifications. Hence, 
according to the relevant regulation18, the police officer in charge, at or above the 
county level, shall determine the necessity of questioning. Although necessity 
operates as a loosely defined threshold, solidly grounded suspicion, rather than 
slender suspicion, is needed in practice. The law states explicitly that, before the 
interrogation, the investigator should acquaint himself with the case and its 
supporting evidence, and then plan and outline the questioning19. 
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 Ibid. Article 178. 
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It is also worth noting that, under the 1979 CPL, there is no limit on the 
duration of interrogation through summons. In contrast, according to the 1996 
CPL, the duration of interrogation through summons shall not exceed 12 hours, 
and the police are forbidden from turning a summons interrogation into a de 
facto detention under the disguise of successive summonses (Art. 92). In essence, 
the revised CPL wants to limit the initial police investigation to sources of 
objective information other than of the potentially guilty. Nevertheless, this does 
not imply that it relaxes its intention of considering the suspect as an important 
source of testimonial evidence on the whole. Arguably, the revised law devotes 
considerable attention to the interrogation preconditions to make the 
questioning effective and productive. 
 
6.1.2 The “Suspect Speaks” Interrogation 
The Chinese questioning procedure, as mentioned earlier, focuses on fact-
finding (Wei, 2003, 1-3). Accordingly, in practice terms, the lawmakers asked 
thus: What procedure would both be fair and best reveal the truth? From this 
perspective, there was good reason to keep lawyers from speaking on behalf of 
the accused: truth probably would not so well be discovered from the artificial 
defense of others speaking for the suspect. Hence, under the 1979 CPL, 
questioning by the police was conducted without legal advice and without the 
presence of a lawyer. The 1996 CPL improved the rights of the suspect in various 
perspectives, but did not include the right to have a lawyer by his side during 
police questioning. Only after the first interrogation or from the day on which 
compulsory measures are adopted, can the suspect have the right to see his 
attorney (CPL, Art. 96). 
 
Consequently, the suspect himself has to speak in his own defence and 
respond to the evidence as given by the questioner. In contrast to the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which requires 
suspects to make unfettered waivers to the right of remaining silent whenever 
they respond to official inquiry20, in China, they are not free to decide whether to 
submit to the interrogation process in general. A suspect is expected to answer 
questions asked by investigators truthfully and can refuse to respond to only 
those questions that are irrelevant to the case (CPL, Art. 93). Although there is 
no provision in the law as to the consequences that follow from a suspect’s 
silence, such as the fact finder drawing unfavourable inferences from a passive 
reaction, the real concern of continued silence is that such adverse inferences 
will, in fact be drawn, consciously or unconsciously, by the interrogators21 (Chen 
and Lan, 2008). Clearly, if the suspect refuses to respond, the defensive function 
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 ECtHR 29 November 1996, Saunders v. The United Kingdom, (no. 43/1994/490/572), § 55. 
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 Because the police officers believe that if the case against a suspect is false, the suspect is 
likely to speak up and object, and if he remains silent rather than talking, this could only be 
because he has something to conceal or, because he is unable to deny the truth of the 
evidence, which the police have against him (Cui, 2001). 
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will merge with the testimonial function in the current questioning process, and 
his suspicion could appropriately increase. 
 
As truthfulness of the statements elicited cannot be guaranteed, prohibitions 
of torture and other forms of inhuman practices are not open to question (CPL, 
Art. 43). Moreover, the CPL pays special attention to the types of questions that 
need to be asked sequentially during the questioning. According to Article 93 of 
the CPL, ‚when interrogating a suspect, the investigators shall first ask the 
suspect whether or not he has committed any criminal act, and let him state the 
circumstances of his guilt or explain his innocence; then they may ask him 
questions‛. The Chinese legal principle maintains that the suspect’s defence 
comes first because it is primarily designed to prevent the police from 
proceeding on the premise that the suspect is guilty (Ma, 2007). Whatever the 
proclaimed rationale, there is little doubt that this arrangement is advantageous 
to the investigation. The police, as the imperial magistrates, may sit back at the 
beginning and hope that damaging evidence would come out if the concocted 
story of a guilty suspect crumbles on subsequent disclosure of evidence. Such 
damaging evidence may be in the form of inconsistency in the account given by 
the suspect, thereby demonstrating the lies told by the suspect, or in the form of 
failure to answer the questions posed by the police. All this evidence could be 
used either to encourage suspects to confess or against them at their trials (Wei, 
2003). 
 
6.2 Law in Practice and Social Context  
In short, the Chinese law no longer considers confession or voluntary 
admission of guilt as an essential legal component of ending a crime 
investigation, while it still encourages suspects to participate in police 
questioning as a testimonial source. Factual guilt, not legal guilt, is the key word 
here. The criminal procedure, in general, focuses more on the need to prevent 
unreliable statements, than on the restraining of police interrogation powers. 
This perspective is reflected in a strong emphasis on proper preparation prior to 
the questioning, in the limited right to counsel at the pre-trial stage and in the 
‚suspect speaks‛ interrogation model that seeks to gather extensive, detailed 
information and factual accounts from the suspect. Apparently, this model 
presupposes that the interrogator, being impartial and professional, can be 
largely trusted to guarantee both the quantity and the quality of information that 
the interviewee can potentially provide, which are essential to truth-finding. 
 
However, such expectations do not bear out in practice. Many Chinese 
scholars, relying on different sources, such as interviews with present and 
former law enforcement officers, or individual field observation, have made the 
alarming assertion that the problem of confessions produced by xingxun (刑讯) – 
physical force or psychological duress – is widespread in police questionings in 
China (Wu & Vander Beken, 2010). In addition, Cui (2003: 26) comments thus on 
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the fatal effect of police coercion on the reliability of evidence: ‚Although 
confessions elicited by xingxun are not always false, wrongful convictions, with 
no exception, are all because of xingxun‛. 
 
Literature on the causes of police-coerced confessions in criminal 
interrogations covers a wide range of topics in terms of the levels of analysis. 
Notably, besides loopholes or shortcomings in the law and the ineffective 
institutional mechanisms for controlling state powers, the influence of 
traditional cultural values is also considered a reason by some socio-legal 
studies: while coerced confession is absolutely cruel, its exercise depends at 
almost every level on many forms of cooperation and consensus (Lin, Yu and 
Zhang, 2006; Lin, Zhao and Huang, 2006). To further understand the social and 
cultural background because of which the pernicious interrogation practices 
persist, it is evident from the foregoing discussion that one must consider the 
relationship between the interrogator and the suspect in the crime investigation. 
An analysis of this relationship, at both macro and micro levels, is presented 
below. 
 
The Paternalistic Criminal Justice System 
 
First, on a macro level, China is still a paternalistic state in which the law 
enforcement is likely to have the real and symbolic status as the protector of 
anonymous collective interests, such as public security or social stability, 
engendering a tendency to ignore concrete interests of individual suspects and 
to lose sight of the power abuse by the investigators within the sphere of crime 
and justice. 
 
Although the CCP has made a series of mistakes since it came into power in 
1949, in Peerenboom’s (2002:42) view, ‚the image *of the Chinese government+ 
remains the same: the father, knowing what is best, takes care of his children‛. 
Today, the CCP leadership, to a large extent, decides what is best for the Chinese 
society and takes ameliorative actions to solve contemporary problems. In the 
last three decades, the state’s economic policy proved to be spectacularly 
successful, improving the Chinese citizens’ living conditions in a relatively short 
run while at the same time creating a high rate of long-term economic growth 
(Peerenboom, 2006). The Chinese government clearly understands the 
importance of maintaining stability which constitutes a prerequisite for 
economic growth and for the CCP’s continuous legitimacy and popularity. 
Hence, to satisfy the practical need for more effective social control, the current 
Chinese criminal justice system altered the principles of law and punishment 
under the Mao era in some aspects and adopted Confucianism and legalist 
legacies in others. As in the pre-reform era, the police, without court approval, 
have the authority to impose administrative sanctions on individuals guilty of 
minor crimes and public order violations. Wrongdoers are dealt with by the 
criminal justice system only when serious offences were involved. Although the 
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police’s administrative power that was once used to control the urban transients 
has been eliminated under the 1996 CPL, their power for detaining criminal 
suspects was extended. No doubt, Chinese police, compared with those of 
Western law enforcement, have greater authority and power over ordinary 
citizens (Biddulph, 1993; Ma, 1997). 
 
Apart from political agenda, another crucial factor in further reinforcing the 
authority of the police lies in social changes within the Chinese civil society in 
the reform era. As China has been moving toward a market economy since 1978, 
the traditional informal social control that relied on rigid household registration 
and employment structure has declined (Dutton, 2000). Concurrently, increased 
mobility has resulted in a class of ‚floating population‛ (liudongrendou, 流动人口
), who are often blamed for urban problems, including the soaring crime rates. 
Given that transients have no attachment, commitment, or involvement in 
communities, subjecting them to stronger formal control by the criminal justice 
system is deemed necessary by urban citizens to curtail crimes (Lu and Drass, 
2002). Moreover, as police officers, following the ‚mass-line‛ in policing, 
actually live and work in a neighbourhood for a long time, most Chinese citizens 
do not view the police as a force limiting their freedom, but as a service resource 
they can rely on (Jiao, 2001). As a result, the formal law enforcement is 
shouldering more responsibility for solving crimes, thus reinforcing itself in both 
real and symbolic senses (Wong, 2001). 
 
Importantly, within the paternalistic state, as a legal professional group, 
Chinese defence counsels have not been a prominent force in balancing state 
powers. In imperial China, the status of scriveners, who were labelled as 
‚litigation tricksters‛, was regarded low, because the pursuit of self-interest by 
adverse litigation, as it signifies one’s refusal to take responsibilities for one’s 
action, is at odds with the paramount virtue of social harmony (Yu, 2002; Clark, 
2008). Under socialist China, the state belongs to the people; so, lawyers are not 
expected to oppose the state in a criminal investigation but shoulder dual 
responsibilities of not only protecting the rights of the suspect, but also, more 
importantly, helping the state to seek the truth (Lu and Miethe, 2002; Clark, 
2008). In the absence of an officially recognized legal profession for millenniums, 
the use of legal counsel is rather new to the Chinese criminal justice system. 
Until recently, more than 70 percent of the criminal cases were processed 
without lawyers appearing in court on behalf of the defendants (Wu, 2006). In 
this context, Lu and Miethe (2002: 277) observed thus: ‚contrary to the image of 
an advocate of the defendant, Chinese attorneys under the reform policies still 
play a major role in legitimizing the current legal system.‛ Chinese counsels, 
even those seasoned attorneys, know how to obtain the best results for their 
clients by not being ‚combative‛ or ‚arrogant‛, but being ‚deferential‛ and 
‚submissive‛ during the criminal proceedings (Liu and Scymour, 1998). 
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Undoubtedly, the current paternalistic procedure structure in which the 
police have the sole responsibility for implementing procedural safeguards, if 
frequently unchallenged, is dangerous. Though coercive questioning, an extreme 
means to get objective evidence, implies weakness of the daily operations of the 
police22, it can also be attributed to the ‚system‛ of criminal justice that allows it 
to exist. For law enforcement as a whole, by relying heavily on confession to 
solve crimes, it is able to divert the available funds to other arguably more 
productive uses23. 
 
Interrogational Paternalism 
 
Second, on a micro level within the interrogation space, the relationship 
between the interrogator and the suspect has been and continues to be 
paternalistic. The attitude of criticizing wrongdoers for their unwillingness to 
repent for and admit to the crime facts, which has driven from the familist or 
paternalism tradition, continues to offer plenty of psychological comfort to the 
police. Although the ‚open-door‛ policy has increased individualism in China, 
to a large extent, Confucian doctrines of filial piety and family loyalty still strongly 
influence the modern Chinese family relationships (Whyte and Parish, 1984). It 
was suggested that the Chinese family often dominates the individuals by 
forcing them to come to terms with family values and tradition (Lu, Zhang and 
Miethe, 2002). With such moral cultivation, according to Fairbank (1987:31-32), 
‚Chinese well habituated to the family system have been prepared to accept 
similar patterns of status in other institutions, including the official hierarchy of 
the government‛. Hence, in the interrogation room, the suspect’s submissive 
and honest attitude seems to be considered legitimate and morally valid by the 
interrogators. In addition, the societal view on crime and wrongdoers gives law 
enforcement ‚additional moral legitimacy to take measures to coerce confessions 
and press for repentance‛ (Ren, 1997, 132). As a survey conducted in 2006 
shows, the public’s attitude towards police pernicious interrogation practices is 
tolerant, and even supportive (Lin, Zhao and Huang 2006: 133-4). 
 
                                                             
22
 Specifically, the daily operations of the police are undermined by a shortage of budget 
(Zhu, 2006; Chen, 2007) and poorly trained police officers (Wang 2006); the police force is 
undersized and functions by using underdeveloped investigative methods (Zuo and Zhou 
2002; Wu 2008). 
23
 Chen (2007: 59) argues that the importance of increasing national investment in criminal 
investigation has never been fully recognized by the Chinese government. Since the advent 
of an open economy and a reform policy, the government’s financial input in  criminal 
investigations, concerning personnel or technology, has not increased concurrently with the 
significant rise in crime as well as the changes in crime patterns. Owing to limited budget, 
some forensic techniques of crime procedure, like DNA testing, cannot be employed (Chen, 
2007). 
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7 Conclusion 
Even a cursory review of the interrogation rules of the imperial, Mao and 
reform eras will suffice to demonstrate just how remarkable has been China’s 
criminal justice transformation. Notwithstanding the many shortcomings in the 
current interrogation procedure, dramatic progress has been made in creating a 
fair questioning process that not only addresses the concern over factual 
accuracy of statements but also emphasizes the fairness of the manner in which 
they are obtained. Most strikingly, though police torture in criminal 
interrogation is part of the dim and dark history of Chinese criminal law, today’s 
China, by virtue of the provisions of criminal procedure and criminal law, 
forbids the practice wherein the suspect or the accused should be forced, by 
actual or metaphorical ‚arm-twisting‛, to respond to police inquiries. 
Nonetheless, the result might not always be what the law intends to achieve: 
numerous Chinese scholars observed that confession obtained by extensive use 
of psychological and physical coercion is still a pervasive problem in crime 
investigations in China today. Several views were offered on the factors that 
contributed to this phenomenon. 
 
This paper offers an alternative perspective on the evolution and operation of 
Chinese interrogation rules, besides positing more nuanced explanations for the 
prevalence of police coerced confession in China. The present historical analysis 
reveals that the imperial, social context which once morally legitimized judicial 
torture is still very much alive today. More precisely, historically, the Chinese 
leadership, through the interplay between Confucianism’s moral standards and 
legalist bureaucracy, relied heavily on informal means to maintain social order 
and settle disputes, and established a powerful, minimalist law enforcement 
authority which was responsible for only conflicts that could not be solved by 
informal mechanisms, and for serious crimes. On the whole, this social control 
model failed to adequately address the need to protect individuals against law 
enforcement interrogation practices that were abusive or overreaching, and 
therefore indirectly contributed to the prevalence of police-coerced confession 
both in the past and in the present. 
 
Considering the future reforms within the current Chinese social context, two 
factors seem to be unconducive for the right to remain silent and the privilege 
against self-incrimination. First, Chinese lawmakers under the reform era 
continued to emphasize the importance of being honest in police interrogation. 
Article 93 of the 1996 CPL provides that ‚the criminal suspect shall answer the 
investigators’ questions truthfully‛. This legal requirement has drawn heavy 
criticism from contemporary legal scholars (He, 2006; Wu, 2006), who claim that 
it denies the suspect’s basic rights to reach an autonomous decision when called 
upon to answer criminal allegations. This is viewed as the essence of the right to 
remain silent in Western culture (Jackson, 2009; Wu, 2011). However, at this 
point, it should be noted that Chinese law was embedded in an altogether 
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different ideological context than the one that gave rise to the right to remain 
silent in the West. As already seen, the imperial Chinese law is largely moralistic 
in nature. Since the Han dynasty, Confucian’s moral standards, particularly 
those dealing with contrition, patriarchal relationships and familial obligations, 
started to become a part of the content of law, and legalist’s reward and 
punishment machineries became the instruments for executing such content. In 
the reform era, the attitudes of being honest about one’s misconduct and being 
submissive to authority continued to be reinforced by Chinese familism. Hence, 
the better way to comprehend the above mentioned provision is not to consider 
it a manifestation of caprice on the part of the present Chinese leadership, but 
rather to recognize it as an expression of the inherent Chinese legal attitude 
which the Chinese lawmakers want to respect and enhance. This is not to say 
that other external pressures of the kind mentioned at the beginning of this 
article, such as the pressure on the PRC to comply with the ‚universal norms‛, 
for instance the privilege against self-incrimination, will not make the content of 
the new laws profoundly different from that of the past, difficult as this may be 
to accomplish. So long as the familist and societal view of crime and wrongdoers 
held sway, the real question is whether the new content can overcome hoary 
practices, values and interpretations. 
 
Second, complicating the task of legal reformers who wish to establish the 
right to remain silent, China is, to a large extent, still a paternalistic state in which 
the law enforcement is likely to have the real and symbolic status as the 
protector of anonymous collective interests, such as social stability, engendering 
a tendency to ignore concrete interests of individual suspects within the sphere 
of crime and justice. It is still debatable whether China will develop a robust civil 
society in which the citizens will strike a similar balance between the concerns 
for individual rights, and for the interests of families, communities and the 
nation, considering the continuity of the political and social control traditions in 
the Chinese society. The CCP, certainly, will not fall from power in the near 
future. Moreover, the familism values of bonding individuals to the family, 
community, and state has enabled the Communist leadership to continue its 
traditional role in manipulating those conventional social control variables either 
by reinforcing their traditional functions or by redirecting their impacts on 
individual citizens. 
 
At this point, the Chinese government, whose image has been badly 
tarnished by police torture, both at home and abroad, does not lack the 
motivation to eliminate coerced confessions. In addition, the desire for 
modernization of China’s political and legal system will inevitably reshape the 
law and social control mechanisms. To be sure, the vicissitudes along the road to 
social development are never predetermined; so, it may be difficult at this point 
to foresee the impact of state policies on social relationships. Nevertheless, given 
that the average citizen’s indifference to the plight of criminal suspects is largely 
due to the high crime rates as a result of the weakened informal social control, 
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particularly on urban transients after the legal reforms, the best chances for a 
better protection of a suspect’s rights and the elimination of coerced confession 
lie in narrowing down the yawning social cleavage rather than widening it. 
There is no doubt that Chinese lawmakers can find a lot of wisdom in the early 
Confucian philosophy. 
 
As Posner (1993) rightly argues, laws are not abstract, sacred entities, but 
socially determined goads for shaping behaviour so as to conform to society’s 
values. Indeed, there can be no wisdom in the choice of a path unless we know 
where it will lead. As we have seen in the first section, the values of community 
relationship and shaming serve as the basis of social inclusion in the Chinese 
communitarian society. Those values are also supportive of an ethical approach 
to investigation and a cooperative interviewing style in police questioning. 
Therefore, in any event, many of the most pressing obstacles for the 
implementation of fair interrogation standards have nothing to do with the early 
Confucian philosophy. Rather, they are institutional in nature. Ultimately, the 
key to the future realization of interrogation fairness is power. How is power to 
be controlled and allocated in the questioning room? According to Peerenboom 
(2004: 137), ‚[i]t is possible that the ruling regime [of China] will be forced to 
accept limitations on its power as a condition for staying in power.‛ Hence, there 
are reasons to believe that the issue of power can be resolved in favour of rule of 
law and law will come to impose ever more meaningful restraints on law 
enforcement in the near future. 
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